Fig.2: The SSEC room in 1948
The operations of the SSEC seemed to harken a new age of computational transparency- mathematicians came and went, and the computer made calculations in full view of anyone who might wish to look through the window. Unbeknownst to the public, the SSEC was used to run a programme called Hippo, which ran simulations of the first hydrogen bomb (Brindle, 2018, p 33). The SSEC ran at least three simulations of a hydrogen bomb explosion during the months it was housed in that shopfront window in New York City- in full public view, but entirely illegible and encrypted. The seeming transparency of the operations hid enormous, insidious power from view- a convergence of covert military aims with commercial, for-profit operations.
The legacies of these two pioneering computers bring forth lessons in modern computing culture. The ENIAC might seem enormous to us, as room sized computers shrink to pocket sized devices; but in reality computational infrastructure has simply expanded to cover the globe. If the ENIAC was a computer that you “lived inside”, by virtue of its colossal walls, we might all be said to now live inside an enormous computer. The walls of the new computational infrastructure, however, are much more difficult to identify.
The modern myth of magical ease is supported by the invisibility of the mechanics and infrastructure that supports and produces technology.
The public debut of the SSEC, and its visibility mediated by the “transparency” of the window separating the computer from the public belied a deeper and greater divide. Even though the computer was out in the open, it did not reveal its process or aim. The aesthetic of transparency concealed an opacity of power and control, and the sinister outcome of the calculations performed. Both computers were inexorably bound to military interests- The ENIAC in its initial development as an artillery fire table calculator, and the SSEC in its use for the Hippo bomb simulation programme.
Through an insistence of transparent self-evidence, the privation of history depoliticizes things- we do not have context, so bourgeois interests can remain anonymous, receding into the background.
In the above example, a differentiating factor between the ENIAC and the SSEC is the visibility of mechanics or “mess” associated with the workings of the machine. Concealment of inner workings is a hallmark of the trajectory of technological design. In the 50s, the “cloud” began to emerge in patent applications- a fuzzy circle, a puffball. What exactly the cloud represented- “a power system, or a data exchange, or another network of computers”(Brindle, 2018, 12) was irrelevant. The function of the cloud as a metaphor was to reduce complexity. The only relevant information, for the patent applicant, was whatever they were proposing- the here and now. The cloud represents ‘over there’, somewhere else, someone else’s problem.
1.c. The Black Box
The emergence of concepts like the cloud, can be seen as part of a wider trend towards black boxing, another kind of mythologised object.
The black box was first described by Bruno Latour, in Pandora's hope: essays on the reality of science studies(1999). Latour sees all phenomena that can possibly be encountered in the world as parts of networks of relations between actants. Some networks are vast, others are small. Blackboxing is a process by which the “joint production of actors and artifacts [is made] entirely opaque” (Latour, 1999, 183). When you use a computer it becomes a functional, self-standing object with both its internal engineering and external relations with other things that make it work hidden from view. The computer would not exist or function without this network, but until the computer breaks the network is invisible and unconsidered. Until that moment, these entities were invisible parts of the “black box” of the device. Blackboxing makes “scientific and technical work” invisible through efficiency- one need only focus on “inputs and outputs” rather than “internal complexity”. Through this process, the work becomes increasingly “opaque and obscure” (Latour, 1999, 304).
Per the myth of Einstein’s brain in Barthes’ account, the labour and knowledge that produced the black box is wiped clean from the slate; as well as the internal operations of the black box itself. “Knowledge [is] reduced to formula” (Barthes, 1957, 69), and our interactions are framed through the lens of consumption rather than engagement.
There is a disempowerment inherent in this dynamic, in which objects stand in for a world of assumed but unseen complexity. In the examples of the ENIAC and SSEC, as well as Einstein’s genius, we can feel part of the line of progress and discovery that produces knowledge. Barthes describes a kind of bourgeois rhetoric in which ‘humankind’ is unified in a kind of liberal assimilationism (1957, 152). This flattening cleaves the class and culture divide between people, and draws attention away from power structures, while allowing the everyday person to feel part of the ‘success’ of a society. Despite this sense of collective progress, the back-ending and blackboxing of the mechanics of technological advances create an experience of spectacle, rather than understanding.